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Lifestyle Risks
This section discusses the regulation of "lifestyle risks, a term that can apply to both substances
and behaviours. Lifestyle risks take place along the line of "abstinence - consumption - abuse - ad-
diction'. This can concern substances such as food, alcohol or drugs, as well as behaviours such as
gambling or sports. The section also addresses the question of the appropriate point of equilibrium
between free choice and state intervention (regulation), as well as the question of when risks can be
considered to be acceptable or tolerable. In line with the interdisciplinary scope of the journal, the
section aims at updating readers on both the regulatory and the scientific developments in the field.
It analyses legislative initiatives and judicial decisions and at the same time it provides insight in-
to recent empirical studies on lifestyle risks.
Distilling Prospects: Reflections on the Proportionality of Minimum
Unit Pricing under EU Law
Oliver Bartlett*
I. Introduction
On 3 May 2013 the Scottish Court of Session ruled
that minimum unit pricing of alcoholic beverages did
not breach EU law on the free movement of goods.
It held that the Alcohol (Minimum Pricing)(Scot-
land) Act 2012,1 passed in June 2012 but not imple-
mented pending the completion of legal action, did
constitute a measure having equivalent effect to a quan-
titative restriction under Article 34 TFEU, but that such
a restriction of trade was justified as proportionate un-
der Article 36 TFEU as it was the most effective way
of achieving the legitimate aim of reducing the con-
sumption levels of harmful and hazardous drinkers.
While the Scottish Government hailed this ruling
as a victory, the Scotch Whisky Association, who led
the legal challenge, have on 6 February 2014 appealed
this decision to the Inner House of the Court of Ses-
sion, and will ask for a reconsideration of the choice
Durham Law School. The author is grateful for the comments of
the anonymous reviewer on the initial draft of this report, and for
the assistance of Mr James Nelson and Mr Guy Barrett with
editing the final draft.
1 Available online at <http://www.legislation.gov.uk/asp/2012/4/
pdfs/asp_201 20004_en.pdf> (last accessed on 9 January 2014).
2 The text of the Draft Order is available online at: <http://ec
.europa.eu/enterprise/tris/pisa/app/search/index.cfm?fuseaction
=pisa notif overview&sNIang=EN&iyear=2012&inum=394&lang
=EN&iBack=2> (last accessed on 9 January 2014).
of the Outer House not to refer the matter to the Court
of Justice of the European Union (CJEU).
This report seeks to support the case for minimum
unit pricing. It will first provide a brief summary of
the legislation and the supporting evidence. Second,
it will analyse the arguments relating specifically to
the proportionality of minimum unit pricing under
EU free movement of goods law in order to show that
the Scottish court's decision was correct. Finally it
will consider the implications that success for mini-
mum unit pricing might have for alcohol control pol-
icy and why the industry vehemently opposes it.
11. The Disputed Legislation and
Supporting Evidence
The dispute over the legality of minimum unit pric-
ing concerns the Alcohol (Minimum Pricing)(Scot-
land) Act 2012. Section 1(2) of the Act amends sched-
ule 3 of the Licencing (Scotland) Act 2005 to include
the provision that 'alcohol must not be sold on the
premises at a price below its minimum price'. The
formula to be used to calculate minimum price is set
as the minimum price per unit x strength of the al-
cohol x volume of alcohol in litres x oo. The mini-
mum price per unit is provisionally set at 50 pence
by Section 2 of the Draft Alcohol (Minimum Price
per Unit)(Scotland) Order 2013.2 Thus, the minimum
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price for a bottle of wine with an alcoholic strength
of 12.5% aby, would be 0.50 X 0.125 x 0.75 x 100 =
£4.69, and for a pint of cider at 4.5% abv would be
0.50 x 0.045 x 0.568 x 100 £ E1.28.
Evidence suggests minimum pricing could be an
effective tool in combatting alcohol related harm.
Since higher levels of alcohol consumption lead to
higher levels of alcohol related harm, both in terms
of average volumes and certain specific patterns of
drinking,3 seeking to reduce consumption through
imposing higher prices on cheaper alcohol would
seem to be one way of consequently reducing harm.
Recent data analysed by Sheffield University in 2012
supports this idea, indicating that setting a minimum
price for alcohol of 50p would result in a 5.7% reduc-
tion in general consumption.4 Such drops come
specifically from reducing 'the consumption of heav-
ier drinkers who prefer these beverages'. Research
suggests that such a sub-population target is legiti-
mate and can result in meaningful harm reductions.
Black et al have surveyed patients admitted to Edin-
burgh hospitals due to alcohol related harm and
found that 'this patient population purchases alcohol
units on average at £0.29 less per unit than that paid
on average by the general Scottish population', that
'of these patients, those who pay the lowest prices
per unit tend to consume the greatest number of
units' and finally that 'this patient population pur
chase 83% of their alcohol at or below £0.50/unit'.8
Further research supports the predicted effectiveness
of minimum pricing policies targeting a reduction in
the consumption and thus harm of heavy drinkers.
A study examining the relationship between mini-
mum prices and alcohol-attributable deaths in British
Columbia between 2002 and 2009 suggests that there
is 'credible evidence of (i) large and significant reduc-
tions in wholly [alcohol-attributable] deaths associat-
ed with co-occurring minimum price increases and
(ii) significant lagged effects for chronic [alcohol-at-
tributable] deaths'.9
Such studies cannot predict all eventualities, and
Black's study recognise that it does not represent all
harmful drinkers in Scotland, and could not cover all
those patients admitted to hospital.o One must also
consider that the effectiveness of minimum pricing
may be influenced by the reaction of the industry,
who will seek to maintain consumption levels
through new marketing strategies that will not ma-
terialise until the policy comes into force. Further ev-
idence is always beneficial. To this end the Scottish
policy shouldbe monitored, so that it canbe observed
whether results on the ground reflect the modelling.
Taking these caveats into account, we still might
conclude that the evidence so far accrued indicates
that minimum pricing has great potential to be an
effective policy tool to reduce alcohol related harm.
The following section examines whether minimum
unit pricing is justified as a proportionate restriction
of trade under the conditions set out by EU free move-
ment of goods law.
Ill. Proportionality of Minimum Unit
Pricing
1. The Decision of the Court of Session
The SWA's petition for judicial review of the Scot-
tish Act 1 argued that the conditions for recourse to
Article 36, which permits restrictions on trade caught
by Article 34 to stand provided they are justified as
proportionate according to certain public interest
grounds, could not be satisfied. Minimum pricing
was accused of being disproportionate on grounds
that the legislative aims were confused, the measures
did not target harmful and heavy drinkers, and less
restrictive measures such as taxation could be used. 12
3 See JOrgen Rehm et al, "The relationship of average volume of
alcohol consumption and patterns of drinking to burden of dis-
ease - an overview" 98 Addiction (2003), pp. 1177 et seqq., at p.
1209; Martin McKee and Annie Britton, "The positive relationship
between alcohol and heart disease in eastern Europe: potential
physiological mechanisms" 91(8) J R Soc Med (1998), pp. 401 et
seqq., at p. 402.
4 Petra Meier et al, Model based appraisal of alcohol minimum
pricing and off licenced trade discount bans in Scotland using the
Sheffield alcohol policy model (v2): - second update based on
newly available data (University of Sheffield, 2012) available on
the internet at <http://www.shef.ac.uk/polopoly fs/1.156503!/file/
scotlandjan.pdf>, at p. 5.
5 Ibid, at p. 1067.
6 Heather Black et al, "The price of a drink: levels of consumption
an price paid per unit of alcohol by Edinburgh's ill drinkers with a
comparison to wider alcohol sales in Scotland" 106 Addiction
(2010), pp. 729 et seqq., at p. 733.
7 ibid, at p. 734.
8 ibid.
9 Jinhui Zhao et al, "The relationship between minimum alcohol
prices outlet densities and alcohol-attributable deaths in British
Columbia, 2002-09" 108 Addiction (2013), pp. 1059 et seqq., at
p. 1066.
10 ibid.
11 The Scotch Whisky Association & Ors [2013] CSOH 70.
12 ibid, at para 33.
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It was furthermore asserted that it would be wrong
to allow the Scottish Government any margin of dis-
cretion.13
After agreeing that the measure was a restriction
on trade under Article 34, Lord Doherty observed
that the 'crucial question is whether there is objec-
tive justification for the measures'.14 To be propor
tionate for the purposes of Article 36, a measure must
be appropriate and necessary to achieve the legiti-
mate aims claimed.1 5 Since minimum pricing was
aimed at reducing alcohol misuse and overconsump-
tion, focusing on harmful and heavy drinkers rather
than eradicating consumption,1 6 it was considered
that the policy pursued legitimate aims under Arti-
cle 36.
On appropriateness, Lord Doherty considered the
evidence to show that harmful drinkers across the
income spectrum tend to buy cheap alcohol, and that
low income harmful drinkers consume far more per
head and are a source of much greater health harm.
He therefore concluded there was objective evidence
that the measures were appropriate to achieve their
aims.1 7
On necessity, the critical issue for Lord Doherty
was 'the comparative effectiveness of minimum pric-
ing and the alternative measures'." He supported ar
guments that minimum pricing would be more ef
fective than increasing excise duties on alcoholic bev-
erages because, amongst other considerations, it
would not be subject to the same constraints as ex-
cise duties are under EU excise duty directives and
13 ibid, at para 34.
14 ibid, at para 48.
15 See Jules Stuyck, "Case C-262/02, Comission v France and CaseC-
429/02, Bacardi France SAS and Television francaise I SA et al,
judgments of the Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice of 13
July 2004" 42 CMLR (2005), pp. 783 et seqq.
16 ibid, at para 54.
17 ibid, at paras 58-60.
18 ibid, at paras 63-66.
19 ibid, at paras 68-69.
20 ibid, at para 71.
21 ibid, at para 53.
22 ibid, at para 79.
23 ibid, at para 81.
24 Commission Communication SG(2012) D/52513.
25 ibid, at p. 6.
26 The Scotch Whisky Association& Ors, supra note 11, at para 36.
27 Stuyck, "Judgments of the Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice
of 13 July 2004", supra note 15, at p. 795 (emphasis added).
would apply exclusively to lower priced alcohol.1 9 He
opined that '[a] system which results in higher prices
for higher strength alcohol appears to be more con-
sistent with the legitimate aims', 20 namely reducing
the number of units consumed by harmful and heavy
drinkers.21 In light of the fact that national authori-
ties are indeed afforded a margin of discretion when
determining to what extent they wish to protect pub-
lic health,22 Lord Doherty concluded that there was
objective justification that minimum pricing would
be more effective than the alternatives in achieving
the aims pursued.23
2. Did the Court of Session Get It Right -
Would the CJEU Agree on
Proportionality and Does the Case
Need Referring?
The Court of Session was correct to conclude that
minimum unit pricing fulfils the conditions of Arti-
cle 36 relating to proportionality. In its Detailed Opin-
ion24 given in response to notification of the Scottish
policy, the Commission contended that minimum
unit pricing appeared disproportionate because 'if
the goal is, for health policy reasons, to reduce alco-
hol consumption via increasing the prices of alco-
holic beverages that goal can be achieved by raising
alcohol taxation across the board'.25 However this
misinterprets the aims since the more important
goal, as the Scottish Government stated in the case,
was 'to target harmful and hazardous drinkers and
'26
reduce their consumption, as well as lowering con-
sumption generally. Since the proportionality prin-
ciple requires that 'another equally effective, but sig-
nificantly less restrictive measure, could not have
been chosen'27 to achieve the aims, not just that a
less restrictive alternative exists, the proposed alter
native measures must be as effective as minimum
pricing at reducing consumption among harmful
and heavy drinkers as well as amongst the popula-
tion generally, irrespective of whether they are less
restrictive.
Contrary to the Commission's claims, evidence
suggests that taxation would not effectively achieve
the primary aim sought. If the primary aim is to re-
duce the consumption levels of harmful and haz-
ardous drinkers, and evidence such as that cited
above suggests that such drinkers buy cheaper alco-
hol and consume more of it, then a measure increas-
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ing the price of cheap alcohol only would appear to
be more effective than a measure which cannot in-
crease the price of cheaper alcohol at a differential
rate to more expensive alcohol.28 The Commission
raised Commission v Greece,2 9 in which the Court ob-
served that the objective of protecting public health
was adequately attained by increasing tobacco prices,
but this is improper authority in this context. Any
level of tobacco consumption is harmful, therefore
increasing prices across the board to cut consump-
tion would be appropriate. However there are vary
ing levels of alcohol consumption that cause varying
levels of harm, thus addressing the most serious lev-
els requires a tailored intervention. The Commission
states that increasing tax 'would impact all products
equally',o however this is not the point of the inter
vention. The Scottish government have chosen to tar
get alcohol drunk by the heaviest drinkers, protect-
ing public health to that extent while balancing the
interests of moderate drinkers, a choice that is with-
in the discretion of national governments to make.
Consequently, if minimum pricing is on available ev-
idence the most effective way of achieving the spe-
cific aim sought by the Scottish Government, it must
be necessary to achieve the aim and proportionate.
The CJEU would be unlikely to overturn the Court
of Session's ruling, should the case be referred. The
Court has a history of allowing Member States a mar
gin of discretion over the extent to which they wish
to protect public health and the way this is achieved.
In Aragonesa, involving a Catalan ban on the adver
tising of alcohol above a certain strength in public
areas, the Court held that where no harmonised rules
existed in aparticular area'it is for the Member States
to decide on the degree of protection which theywish
to afford to public health and on the way on which
that protection is to be achieved'," provided this is
within the bounds of the principle of proportionali-
ty, a decision which was followed in Commission v
France.3 2 Furthermore, Commission v Portugal held
that the effective protection of health'requires awide
range of preventative measures ... with the result that
the Member States have in principle complete dis-
cretion to determine how strict the checks to be car
ried out are to be'.3 Member States therefore have
the right to decide what to prioritise and how to pur
sue this where there is no secondary EU law to guide
them, providing trade restrictive measures are pro-
portionate. The Scottish Government's choice to
adopt minimum pricing measures in pursuit of ad-
dressing the health problems posed by the heaviest
drinkers falls within this remit., and the Court of Ses-
sion was correct in recognising this.
The CJEU has also consistently held that the eval-
uation of the factual situation for the purpose of as-
sessing proportionality is for the national court to
make. In Gourmet the Court infamously held that the
decision on proportionality, 'calls for an analysis of
the circumstances of law and fact which characterise
the situation in the Member States concerned, which
the national court is in a better position than the
Court of Justice to carry out'. 3 Other cases echo this
approach. In Greenham the Court declared that the
national court 'alone has jurisdiction to determine
and evaluate the facts in the proceedings before it'.3 5
In Mickelsson and Roos, the Court found that it was
for the national court to ascertain whether certain
conditions necessary for the fulfilment of the propor
tionality test were made out. 3 Evidently, if the Court
of Session has evaluated the evidence on minimum
unit pricing and is satisfied that it is the most effec-
tive measure to achieve the aims sought, then due to
the consistency of the case law it is extremely likely
that the CJEU will defer to that judgment should the
case be referred. Consequently the Court of Session's
decision not to refer the case should be considered
sound.
The next section will consider the wider implica-
tions of this outcome, particularly what success for
Scotland's minimum pricing policy could mean for
the future of alcohol control policy, and why the al-
cohol industry endeavours to block minimum pric-
ing legislation.
28 See comments in Liam Donaldson and Paul Rutter, "Commentary
on Black et al. (2011): Minimum pricing of alcohol - a solution
whose time has come" 106 Addiction (2011), pp. 737 et seqq., at
p. 737.
29 Case C-216/98 Commission v Greece [2000] ECR 1-8921.
30 Commission Communication, supra note 24, at p. 7.
31 Joined Cases C-1/90 and C176/90 Aragonesa [1991] ECR 1-4179,
at para. 16.
32 Cases C-262/02 Commission v France [2004] ECR 1-06569, at
para. 33.
33 Case C-265/06 Commission v Portugal [2008] ECR 1-02245, at
para. 58.
34 Case C-405/98 Konsumentombudsmannen v Gourmet Interna-
tional Products [2001] ECR 1-01795, at para. 33
35 Case C-95/01 Greenham and Abel [2004] ECR 1-01352, at para.
33
36 Case C-142/05 Aklagaren v Percy Mickelsson and Joakim Roos
[2009] ECR 1-04273, at para. 40.
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IV. Wider Regulatory Issues Raised by
Minimum Unit Pricing
An initial consequence of success for minimum pric-
ing in Scotland is that further states may decide to
implement the policy themselves. The potential for
this is illustrated by the fact that following Scotland's
notification of the policy to the Commission, sever
al Member States lodged detailed opinions with the
Commission, many of which were promptedby com-
plaints of the national alcohol industries, which have
attempted to frame the problem during this debate
so as to distract attention from the true effectiveness
of the policy. 3 7 Five detailed opinions were submit-
ted, with five further states offering comments, lev-
els of interest that would only arise if there were se-
rious concern that the spread of minimum pricing is
a genuine possibility. Thus for example, it was report-
ed that Bulgarian wine producers encouraged their
Government to raise objections to the policy,3 'hence
the Bulgarian opinion obligingly contended that the
measures 'will create many obstacles to trade for Bul-
garian wine and spirit producers' 39 and that '[t]his
37 See Benjamin Hawkins and Chris Holden, "Framing the alcohol
policy debate: industry actors and the regulation of the UK bever-
age alcohol market" 7(1) Critical Policy Studies (2013), pp. 53 et
seqq.
38 Nathalie Thomas, "Bulgaria wants to block UK minimum alcohol
pricing" The Telegraph, 14 September 2012, available on the
internet at <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/
retailandconsumer/9544535/Bulgaria-wants-to-block-UK
-minimum-alcohol-pricing.html> (last accessed on 9 January
2014).
39 Text of opinion released to BBC Scotland, available on the
internet at <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland
-politics-22184541> (last accessed on 9 January 2014).
40 Ibid.
41 Text of opinion released to BBC Scotland, available on the
internet at <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland
-politics-22188373> (last accessed on 9 January 2014).
42 Civil Servant, November 2010, cited in "Chris Holden and
Benjamin Hawkins, "Whisky gloss': The alcohol industry, devolu-
tion and policy communities in Scotland' 28(3) Public Policy and
Administration (2013), pp. 253 et seqq, at p. 262.
43 On industry efforts to promote self-regulation and partnership, see
Oliver Bartlett, "Under the Influence? The Alcohol Industry's
Involvement in the Implementation of Advertising Bans" 4(3)
European Journal of Risk Regulation (2013), pp. 383 et seqq.
44 Hawkins and Holden, "Framing the alcohol policy debate", supra
note 37, at p. 59.
45 Martin McKee, "Minimum unit pricing for alcohol - the case is
overwhelming" 22(4) European Journal of Public Health (2012),
pp. 451 et seqq, at p. 451.
46 See Oliver Bartlett and Amandine Garde, "Time to Seize the (Red)
Bull by the Horns: The European Union's Failure to Protect Chil-
dren from Alcohol and Unhealthy Food Marketing" 38(4) Euro-
pean Law Review (2013) pp. 498 et seqq., at pp. 508-510.
would mean a contraction of sales of Bulgarian
wines'. 40 The French opinion summarises the con-
cerns of the industry in other Member States that 'if
this regulation is adopted by Scotland, third coun-
tries who import wine and spirits originating in the
European Union may feel authorised to take similar
measures'.41 The industry is doing all they can to
avoid minimum unit pricing catching on, however
judging from the interest generated by the present
legal challenge, turning the European spotlight on it
might be a double edged sword if the policy works
as expected. It is therefore important to reiterate that
the policy be monitored to determine whether such
expectations are being met.
The graver concern for industry though is that the
success of a hard legislative measure could demon-
strate that alcohol production and sale requires
stricter legislative measures, even at the expense of
currently favoured self regulation. The industry does
not want '[their] own country to be regulating the al-
cohol industry and giving the impression that the in-
dustry can't be trusted to regulate itself'.42 The indus-
try have lobbied extremely hard to convince govern-
ments and regulators around the world that self reg-
ulation works and that it works more effectively than
legislation, and have worked hard to portray them-
selves as partners in the fight against alcohol abuse. 43
It is unsurprising that research has found 'a general
reticence expressed by industry respondents towards
any form of government regulation and a fear that
support for minimum pricing may open the door to
other, less desirable forms of regulation in the longer
term'.44 The industry is, 'terrified of contagion, as
Scotland shows Europe what is possible'45 in terms
of designing, passing and maintaining a coherent
and effective legislative policy that will reduce the
consumption of alcohol. If minimum pricing is em-
braced throughout Europe and does reduce alcohol
related mortality, questions will have to be asked as
to whether faith in self regulation, which has been
shown to be ineffective at controlling many aspects
of alcohol production and marketing,46 can be main-
tained in the face of demonstrably effective legisla-
tive policies.
V. Conclusion
The conclusion to the minimum pricing saga will cer
tainly be watched closely by stakeholders. If the fresh
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appeal of the SWA does eventually find its way to
the CJEU, then a verdict cannot realistically be ex-
pected until the latter half of this decade.
This report has attempted to contribute to the
speculation that will doubtless accumulate in that
time by suggesting that Scotland's minimum pric-
ing policy was rightfully upheld by the Court of Ses-
sion as a proportionate, evidence based response,
and that any reference to the CJEU should confirm
this. It reflected on reasons for the industry to dis-
like the policy, including the potential for minimum
pricing to prompt more extensive legislative con-
trols.
Minimum unit pricing and other related legisla-
tive policies hold the potential to make a tangible dif
ference to the fight against alcohol related mortality.
It is time that hard action on public health took cen-
tre stage, and there is every chance that a success for
minimum unit pricing in Scotland could provide the
necessary impetus.
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